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Abstract— When working with AI and advanced automation, 
human responsibility for outcomes becomes equivocal. We applied 
a newly developed responsibility quantification model (ResQu) to 
the real world setting of a control room in a dairy factory to calculate 
workers’ objective responsibility in a common fault scenario. We 
compared the results to the subjective assessments made by 
different functions in the diary. The capabilities of the automation 
greatly exceeded those of the human, and the optimal operator 
should have fully complied with the indications of the automation. 
Thus, in this case, the operator had no unique contribution, and 
the objective causal human responsibility was zero. However, 
outside observers, such as managers, tended to assign much higher 
responsibility to the operator, in a manner that resembled aspects 
of the “fundamental attribution error”. This, in turn, may lead to 
unjustifiably holding operators responsible for adverse outcomes 
in situations in which they rightly trusted the automation, and 
acted accordingly. We demonstrate the use of the ResQu model for 
the analysis of human causal responsibility in intelligent systems. 
The model can help calibrate exogenous subjective responsibility 
attributions, aid system design, and guide policy and legal 
decisions.  
 
Keywords—Intelligent systems, Decision support systems, 
Human–computer interaction (HCI), Cognitive Engineering 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced automation have 
become part of finance and banking (e.g., algorithmic trading 
and automatic credit approvals), transportation (e.g., 
autonomous vehicles), medicine (e.g., advanced decision 
support systems, and medical robotics), industry (e.g., 
automated production facilities and control rooms), and other 
domains. In these systems, computers and humans share 
information collection and evaluation, decision-making and 
action implementation.  
When interacting with intelligent systems, human 
responsibility becomes equivocal. For example, what is the 
human responsibility when all information arrives through a 
system that collects and analyzes data from various sources, 
without the human having any independent information? The 
determination of the human causal responsibility is particularly 
important in the design and investigation of intelligent systems 
that can lead to injury and even death, such as autonomous 
vehicles or automated control systems in industry that involve 
hazardous materials.  
To date, the subject of human responsibility was investigated 
mostly from philosophical, ethical, moral or legal perspectives, 
but much less from cognitive engineering perspective of human 
interaction with intelligent systems.  
Numerous philosophical and legal studies investigated 
different facets of the concept of responsibility ]3-1[ . When 
humans interact with intelligent systems, role responsibility 
refers to the specific roles and duties assigned to the humans, 
for which they are accountable to others. However, this role 
assignment does not specify the causal association between the 
human actions and the overall outcomes. This relation is 
defined by causal responsibility, which describes the actual 
human contribution to the outcomes and consequences.  
The ability to control a system and the resulting 
consequences is a necessary condition for attributing causal 
responsibility ]4[ . As the level of system intelligence increases, 
there is a shift towards shared control, in which the human and 
computerized systems jointly make decisions or control actions 
]5[ . There may also be supervisory control, in which the human 
sets high-level objectives, monitors the system and only 
intervenes if necessary. In intelligent systems, with artificial 
intelligence, machine-learning and neural networks, developers 
and users may not be able to fully control or predict all possible 
behaviors and outcomes, since internal structures can be opaque 
(“black box”) and can occasionally produce peculiar and 
counterintuitive results  ]7 ,6[ . Subsequently, humans may no 
longer be able to control intelligent systems sufficiently to be 
rightly considered fully responsible for their outcomes [8-12], 
and the intelligent system (or its developers) may share some of 
the responsibility ]41 ,31[ . This difficulty to determine human 
responsibility with intelligent systems leads to a “responsibility 
gap” in the ability to divide causal responsibility between 
humans and systems ]16 ,15 ,9[ .  
In addition, there is a demand to involve humans in 
automated processes in a manner that will facilitate 
“meaningful human control” ]17[ . However, simply adding a 
human into the loop does not assure that the human will have 
meaningful control. There may be cases when the human 
cannot supervise the system adequately, or when the human has 
to make decisions, based exclusively on input from automated 
functions that one cannot evaluate independently ]18[ . 
Currently, there are different, and at times conflicting 
interpretations and policies regarding meaningful human 
control, and system designers lack models and metrics to 
analytically address this issue ]19[ . 
To bridge the responsibility gap, we developed a theoretical 
Responsibility Quantification model (ResQu model) of human 
responsibility in intelligent systems ]20[ , to enable us to divide 
causal responsibility between the human and the intelligent 
system. Using information theory, we defined a quantitative 
measure of causal responsibility, which is based on the 
characteristics of the operational environment, the system and 
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the human, and the function allocation between them. The 
ResQu responsibility is defined as the expected share of the 
unique human contribution to the overall outcomes. This 
measure can also be used to quantify the level of meaningful 
human control, based on the ground that meaningful human 
control requires the human to have some causal responsibility 
for the outcomes. 
The ResQu model is a normative theoretical model that 
computes the optimal level of responsibility, a rational human 
should adopt. However, in reality, people may act non-
optimally when they interact with intelligent systems ]26-21[ . 
In a second study, we analyzed the descriptive abilities of the 
ResQu model to predict actual human behavior in controlled 
laboratory interactions with an automated decision aid ]27[ . We 
showed that the ResQu model can also serve as a descriptive 
model for predicting actual human responsibility or human 
perceptions of their own responsibility. The results also showed 
a systematic tendency to attribute more responsibility to another 
person than to oneself, in the same situation, in a manner that 
resembles aspects of the “fundamental attribution error” in 
social psychology ]30-28[ .  
In the current study, we expand the research by applying the 
ResQu model to a real-world setting. To do so, we examined a 
fault scenario in a control room of a cheese-making factory 
(dairy). We calculated the objective ResQu responsibility 
measure for the control room worker, in the selected scenario, 
and compared the results to subjective assessments of the 
operator's responsibility, made by different functions in the 
diary.  
 
II. THE PRODUCTION PROCESS AND FAULT SCENARIO 
The factory is a cheese making factory (dairy) located in 
Israel. The plant produces cheeses of various kinds, 24 hours a 
day, every day of the week - excluding Saturday. The 
production line includes a milk pasteurization system, a pipe 
system that transports milk and milk products between different 
production stations, 30 large containers for storage of  incoming 
milk from milk farms, other tanks for storage of different 
substances (milk sub-products, or cleaning materials), a large 
number of automatic packaging machines, and cooling systems 
operating on heat exchangers. Also installed is a cleaning 
system that is connected to each of the milk storage containers, 
which is used to wash and clean the containers and the pipe 
system when a container is emptied from milk, before new milk 
can be pumped into the container. 
All processes in the production and storage systems are 
controlled from a single control room. The control room is run 
24-hours a day by an operator and a shift supervisor, in two 12-
hours shifts. Workers in the control room are required to ensure 
that the processes are carried out properly and have to intervene 
in fault situations. To do so, they use a computerized control 
system, which displays the factory's piping and instrumentation 
diagram (P&ID), including the states of various containers, 
pipes, taps, milk flow sensors, temperatures, and various alerts 
that indicate technical faults that require the operator’s 
intervention. In case of such an alert, the operator (with the 
assistance of the shift supervisor) is the one responsible for 
selecting the correct response, which is then carried out by the 
automated control system. Selection of an incorrect action, in 
case of a fault scenario, can lead to substantial losses. The duties 
of the operator and the shift supervisor are not limited to 
interactions with the automated control system. They are also 
responsible for the manual connections of pipes between the 
milk delivery trucks that arrive during the day and the milk 
containers, physically checking various faults, alerted by the 
control system, informing maintenance personnel on technical 
issues, and more. Thus, there are times in which they operate 
under high workload, or during which one of them has to leave 
the control room. 
For the current study, we selected a rather common fault 
scenario in which there is a malfunction in a container-mounted 
sensor, which is used to alert that the container is empty of milk 
and needs to be rinsed and cleaned. In normal operation, each 
container has periods, along the day, in which it contains milk 
(to produce various dairy products) and periods when it is 
empty (from the time the milk runs out to the moment it is 
refilled with new milk). Before refiling with new milk, the 
container needs to be cleaned. A container-mounted sensor 
activates an indication in the control room’s P&ID display, 
stating that a certain container is empty. Upon such an alert, the 
control room operator should initiate container cleaning, by 
pressing a button that starts an automatic flushing process with 
cleaning material. When this process is complete, the container 
can be refilled with milk. The container-mounted sensor 
sometimes suffers from an electrical short, that disables its 
ability to detect the presence of milk. This malfunction causes 
the automated system in the control room to falsely present an 
alert, indicating that the container is empty.  Note that due to 
the physical nature of the sensor’s operation, it is not possible 
for the sensor to falsely present that there is milk in an empty 
container. This fault scenario is not rare, and according to 
factory data, it occurs on average once a month, in one of the 
30 milk containers. 
In the above fault scenario, if the operator complies with the 
alert and presses the automatic flushing button, detergents are 
pumped into the container, ruining all the remaining milk. 
Usually, after about 5 minutes, the operator’s mistake is 
detected, as the cheese production line will start to release green 
colored milk product, which are mixed with detergents, and the 
production line workers will alert the control room operator to 
stop the milk flow from the container. On the other hand, there 
could be cases in which the operators might suspect that the 
alert is false, for example, if the operators remember that only 
a short time ago, they filled the specific container with newly 
arriving milk, so it is therefore unlikely that the container is 
empty. If this is the case, the operator can go to the specific 
container and physically examine whether it still has milk. To 
do so, the operator leaves the control room for about 15 
minutes, goes to the container area, climbs a ladder to the top 
of the container, opens the top lid and examines the milk level. 
If a malfunction in the container-mounted sensor is detected, 
the operator informs maintenance personnel, which 
subsequently repair or replace the sensor.  
 
III. OBJECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY QUANTIFICATION 
In the context of the above fault scenario, the automated control 
system serves as a binary alert system for the presence of milk 
  3                                                                                       
 
 
in the milk container. In this case, the ResQu model is reduced 
to relatively simple formulas [20,27].  
Let X denote the binary set of the action alternatives for the 
human, and Y denote the binary classification set for the system. 
Then, the human causal responsibility is defined as  
 
                𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑋) ≝ ு(௑/௒)
ு(௑)
 = ு(௑,௒)ିு(௑)
ு(௑)
                          (1) 
 
where H(X) is Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of 
uncertainty related to a discrete random  
variable X  
                 𝐻(𝑋) = − ∑ 𝑝(𝑥)𝑙𝑜𝑔ଶ𝑝(𝑥)௫∈ఞ                              (2) 
and H(X/Y) is the conditional entropy, which is a measure of the 
remaining uncertainty about a variable X when a variable Y is 
known.  
         𝐻(𝑋/𝑌) = − ∑ 𝑝(𝑦) ∑ 𝑝(𝑥/𝑦)௫∈ఞ 𝑙𝑜𝑔ଶ𝑝(𝑥/𝑦)௬∈ఊ       (3) 
The ratio Resp(X) quantifies the expected exclusive share of the 
human in determining the action selection variable X, given the 
system’s classification Y. By definition, Resp(X) ∈ [0,1]. 
Resp(X)=1 if, and only if, the human action selection X is 
independent from the system’s classification result Y. 
Resp(Z)=0 if, and only if, Y completely determines X, in which 
case the human actions are exclusively determined by the 
system’s classifications.  
To calculate the ResQu responsibility measure, for the 
selected fault scenario at the dairy, one must deduce the 
underlying distributions of Y and X and their mutual relation. 
On average, the milk in a container suffices for 4 hours of 
production, and flushing and cleaning an empty container takes 
1 hour. Thus, on average, in a 24 hour day there are 
24/(4+1)=4.8 milk cycles. In a working month, the factory 
works for 24 hours a day on 27 days. This amounts to an 
average of 129.6 milk cycles for each container. 
On average, there are 4.8 true alerts a day (at the end of each 
milk cycle) for each container, indicating that the container is 
empty (True Positives). As presented above, a fault in one of 
the 30 milk container sensors occurs on average once a month 
(27 working days). Thus, for a single container, there is a daily 
average of ଵ
ଷ଴
∙ ଵ
ଶ଻
= 0.00123 False Alerts, which falsely 
indicates that the container is empty. Thus, given an alert that a 
certain container is empty, there is a 4.8/(4.8+0.0012)=0.99975 
probability that the alert is true. This is the Positive Predictive 
Value (PPV) of the automated system. Respectively, given an 
alert, there is only a 0.00025 probability that it is false. 
On average each container is refilled with milk, every 5-7 
hours, in a process that requires the operator to manually 
connect pipes to the milk containers. Thus, the operator is 
somewhat able to assess independently whether a specific 
container contains milk by recalling when he or she last refilled 
that container. However, due to the large number of milk 
containers, this subjective assessment is not perfect. The 
operators estimated that they have a relatively good chance, of 
.9, to correctly and independently assess the true state of each 
milk container, whether it is empty or contains milk. 
Nevertheless, they may initiate cleaning of a container only 
when there is a relevant alert to do so. Table I summarizes the 
joint distribution of the true state of the container, and the 
operator’s perception of it, upon alert arrival. 
 
 Thus (using Bayes' theorem and Table I), with an alert, if the 
operator thinks that the container is empty, there is 
0.899775/(0.899775+  0.000025 )=0.99997 probability that it is 
indeed empty. If the operator thinks that the container is not 
empty, there is still a very high probability of 
0.099975/(0.099975+0.000225)=0.99775 that it is actually 
empty, due to the very high PPV of the system.  
The operator’s action selection, given an alert, depends on 
the costs associated with wrong decisions (correct decisions and 
their related costs and benefits represent the nominal state of 
normal operation). When there is a false alert that a container is 
empty, and the operator complies with the alert and initiates 
automatic flushing, there is a direct average cost of 5,040 NIS, 
due to the price of the mean level of milk content in a milk 
container and the price of the detergents used. Besides this 
direct cost, there is also an indirect high cost, due to the damage 
to the operator's reputation and competence in the eyes of the 
factory management and production line workers (the operator 
is not fined personally for such a mistake). When there is a true 
alert, but the operator wrongly thinks that it is false and goes to 
physically check the milk content in the container, there is an 
average cost of 750 NIS, which reflects the revenue loss, due to 
the 15 minutes delay in starting the next production cycle. 
Besides this direct cost, there is also an indirect cost, due to the 
physical effort involved in walking to the tanks, climbing the 
container and examining the milk level, and the cost of leaving 
the control room for 15 minutes, which may be problematic 
when the workload in the control room is high (e.g. in the 
morning, when many tank trailers with fresh milk arrive). 
We now combine the above costs and probabilities to 
compute the optimal action selection that minimizes expected 
costs. Assume that when the alert arrives, the operator also 
thinks that that the container is empty. Thus, the probability that 
the container is indeed empty is 0.99997, so if the operator 
wrongly chooses to physically go and inspect the milk content, 
there will be an associated average cost of 0.99997·750=749.98 
NIS. However, there is still a very low chance of 0.00003 that 
the container is not empty, so there is an associated average cost 
of 0.00003·5040= 0.14 NIS, to initiating the cleaning process. 
Thus, the optimal strategy, in this case, is to comply with the 
alert, by initiating the cleaning process. It is easy to show that 
this is also the optimal action when the operator sees an alert, 
but thinks that the container is not empty, upon alert arrival. 
Thus, the optimal strategy is to always comply with the alert, 
even if the operator suspects that it is false. This results from 
the very high PPV of the alert system, compared to the human, 
and the cost structure.  
TABLE I - JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRUE STATE OF THE 
CONTAINER, AND THE OPERATOR’S PERCEPTION OF IT, UPON ALERT. 
  Operator’s perception Marginal 
distribution 
of container   “Empty” 
“Not 
Empty” 
True 
state, 
upon 
alert  
Empty  0.899775 0.099975 0.99975 
Not 
Empty 0.000025 0.000225 0.00025 
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We now compute the objective ResQu responsibility 
measure, using (1). Under the above optimal strategy, the 
automated sensor classification (denoted by Y) completely 
determines the operator’s response (denoted by X). The 
operator should always initiate a cleaning process upon an alert, 
and do nothing when the signal is that “there is still milk”. In 
terms of entropies this actually means that H(X/Y)=0 since, 
given Y (the type of systems indication), there is no uncertainty 
left regarding X (the operator’s’ action selection). Thus, the 
ResQu objective measure for human responsibility equals zero. 
This is logical, since under the optimal strategy, the operator 
actually serves as a kind of a physical mean that only transforms 
system indications into prescribed actions, and hence has no 
true unique contribution to the action selection process. 
 
IV. SUBJECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ASSESSMENTS 
We presented descriptions of three different fault scenarios, 
related to the failure discussed above, to different functions in 
the plant: a control room operator, a shift manager in the control 
room, a production line worker, the quality assurance manager 
of the dairy, and the chief financial officer of the diary. The 
participants filled out a questionnaire, providing their 
subjective judgments on the action selection and responsibility 
of the control room worker, in each of the scenarios. The action 
selection was rated on a 1-5 scale, where 1 is “didn’t act 
properly” and 5 is “acted properly” and the responsibility was 
rated on a 0-100% scale, where 0 is “not responsible at all for 
the losses” an 100% is “fully responsible for the losses”. We 
also asked the participants to explain their choices. 
A. Scenario I – A Large financial loss due to incorrect 
cleaning of a container, while still full of milk  
According to this scenario, during a busy morning shift, the 
control room was alerted that one container is out of milk and 
needs to be cleaned. The shift manager (who had filled that 
container with milk, about half an hour earlier) was absent from 
the control room, busy with another necessary task. The 
operator complied immediately with the alert and initiated a 
cleaning process. About 5 minutes later, a production line 
worker rushed to the control room and updated that this was a 
mistake and that the production must be stopped. About 2,000 
liter of milk, in the container had to be discarded, which is 
equivalent to a loss of 10,000 NIS.   
Fig. 1 presents the subjective scores, made by each of the 
functions in the dairy, in the first scenario. We can see that there 
is a large difference in the subjective assessment made by the 
control room operator, and those made by all the all the other 
functions in the plant.  
The operator stated that the operator’s action, in the scenario, 
was mostly correct and that the operator’s responsibility for the 
losses is low. He explained that the operator acted in accordance 
with the alert, and that it is customary and logical to act in such 
a way, due to the high reliability of the alert system and the fact 
that many alerts arrive every day. The shift supervisor rated the 
operator’s action as wrong and held the operator fully 
responsible for the losses. He explained that the operator could 
have called back the shift supervisor for consulting, which 
might have prevented the damages.  
 
 
Fig. 1.  Subjective scores in the 1st Scenario. 
 
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Quality Assurance 
Manager (QAM) gave similar scores to those given by the shift 
supervisor. In their view, a full tank of milk had be to discarded 
because of the operator's mistake and because he did not consult 
with the shift manager. Thus, the operator acted wrongly and is 
fully responsible for the adverse outcomes. The production line 
worker had a similar assessment. From his point of view, in 
general, the control room operators are fully responsible for 
such mistakes, which stop production and cause more work for 
the production workers (e.g. extra cleaning activities, re-
pasteurization, etc.).  
To conclude, there was high diversity in the subjective 
ratings between the different functions, with a systematic 
tendency to subjectively assign high responsibility values to the 
operator, even though he complied with the alert (and thus 
objectively had zero causal responsibility).  
B. Scenario II – A medium financial loss due to incorrect 
cleaning of a partially filled container 
According to this scenario, toward the end of an afternoon 
shift, the control room was alerted that one container is out of 
milk, and needs to be cleaned. The operator remembered that 
this container was filled with milk some hours ago, so the alert 
seemed sensible. Due to being tired after a busy shift, the 
operator chose to comply with the alert and initiate a cleaning 
process. About 5 minutes later, a production line worker rushed 
to the control room and updated that this was a mistake and that 
the production must be stopped. About 400 liter of milk that 
were in the container had to be discarded - a loss of 2,000 NIS. 
This scenario is different from the previous one in two aspects. 
First, the incurred loss is smaller (2,000 NIS vs. 10,000 NIS). 
Second, there is a higher correlation between the timing of the 
alert and the possible state of the container, increasing the 
probability that the container did run out of milk. Fig. 2 presents 
the subjective scores, made by each of the functions in the dairy, 
in the second scenario.  
The operator’s assessments were identical to those in the first 
scenario, justifying the action of the control room worker in the 
scenario and relating low responsibility for the loss. In his 
explanations he mentioned also the high correlation between 
the time passed since the container was filled and the timing of 
the alert, so the alert seemed logical. The shift supervisor the 
CFO, and the QAM justified the operator’s action, more than in 
the first scenario, and attributed only partial responsibility for 
the losses (compared to the full responsibility they gave in the 
first scenario).  
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Fig. 2.  Subjective scores in the 2nd Scenario. 
 
This was since the operator action seemed more logical, 
considering the long time since the container was filled with 
milk. However, because there is still a considerable loss, they 
do find the operator responsible, though to a lesser extent than 
in the first scenario. The production line worker’s assessments 
were identical to those in the first scenario, attributing full 
responsibility to the operator. Again, there was a systematic 
tendency to relate higher responsibility, than the objective 
value. 
 
C. Scenario III – A small financial loss due to the operator 
questioning the validity of the alert 
According to this scenario, during a busy morning shift, 
while the control room is temporarily manned only by the 
operator, the control room was alerted that one container is out 
of milk and needs to be cleaned. However, it seemed to the 
operator that he had filled this container only two hours ago, 
and thus he suspected that this is a false alert. He chose to go to 
the storage area and physically check if there is still milk in the 
container. In the inspection, he discovered that the alert was 
correct and there was no milk, so the container needs to be 
cleaned. He went back to the control room and initiated 
cleaning. As a result of the inspection, a 15 minutes delay to the 
daily production process was created, which is equivalent to 
loss of 750 NIS. Fig. 3 presents the subjective scores, made by 
each of the functions in the dairy, in the third scenario.  
In this scenario, the operator justified again the action of the 
control room worker. He explained that if the operator really 
suspected a false alert, he should conduct another examination, 
due to the high costs of falsely initiating cleaning. Contrary to 
previous scenarios, the quality assurance manager supported 
the operator's assessments, stating that the control room worker 
acted correctly and has low responsibility. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Subjective scores in the 3rd Scenario 
 
She explained the she always prefers to check if there is any 
doubt related to the production process, to avoid unnecessary 
major errors, even if this involves "minor" costs. Most other 
evaluators also believed that the operator acted correctly, since 
if it was a false alert, the remaining milk would be discarded, 
and since the price for doing so was rather low. At the same 
time, the shift supervisor, the CFO, and the production worker, 
still considered the operator responsible for the unnecessary 
financial loss, due to the unnecessary delay he created. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
In the selected fault scenario, due to the high abilities of the 
automated alert system (high PPV), compared to those of the 
operator, and the structure of the payoff matrix, a rational 
operator, who minimizes expected costs over time, should 
always act according to the indications from the automated 
system. In this case, the automation unequivocally dictates the 
operator’s actions. Thus, the operator has no unique marginal 
contribution, and has no causal responsibility for the outcomes.  
The results showed differences in the perception of 
responsibility amongst various functions. First, even though in 
the firsts two scenarios the operators acted in accordance with 
the optimal theoretical behavior, by fully complying with the 
alerts, and thus had zero responsibility, they seemed much more 
responsible in the eyes of senior management. Second, in all 
three scenarios there was a systematic tendency to subjectively 
attribute more responsibility to another person than to oneself, 
in a manner that resembled aspects of the “fundamental 
attribution error” in social psychology. This tendency was also 
noted in our previous study [27]. 
The above findings have important implications, regarding 
the responsibility attributed to control room operators, and in 
general, to human interaction with intelligent systems. 
When an operator’s actions are entirely dictated by a strict 
procedure that is based only on automatic indications that are 
presented in the control room, the operator actually acts as a 
kind of a physical mean that only transforms system indications 
into prescribed actions. In this case, the operator has no unique 
contribution, and the objective human causal responsibility is 
zero. However, our results showed systematic tendency of 
outside observers, such as managers, to subjectively attribute 
much higher responsibility. This, in turn, may lead to 
unjustifiably holding operators responsible for adverse 
outcomes in situations in which they rightly trusted the 
automated system, and acted according to its indications. 
More generally, when humans interact with advanced 
intelligent systems, in which they should contribute very little 
to determining the actions, there could be a discrepancy 
between their role responsibility (i.e. the duties which they are 
held accountable for) and their causal responsibility (i.e., their 
actual contribution to outcomes). The human may be 
considered fully legally responsible for adverse outcomes, even 
when not having sufficient control to prevent them or when 
contributing very little to create these outcomes. 
 System designers frequently keep humans in the loop to 
supervise the automation and handle unexpected events. Our 
results demonstrate that simply putting a human into the loop 
does not assure that the human will have a meaningful role and 
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unique contribution to the process. Organizations should 
consider the true added value of the human to system processes, 
beyond the simple role of approving system decisions.  
Falsely claiming that the human is responsible for adverse 
outcomes, even when the person actually contributed very little 
to generate them, may expose the human to unjustified legal 
liability and to the psychological burden of self-blaming.  
The ResQu model can be a useful tool for objectively 
analyzing causal responsibility between the humans and 
intelligent systems. As such, it can aid system design and guide 
policy and legal decisions.  
D. Limitations and future work 
The current analysis is clearly an initial step in the complex 
task of applying the ResQu model to quantify real-life human 
responsibility in intelligent systems. As a very first application 
it was limited to a simple automation and a single type of failure 
scenario. Future work should address more complex 
automations and types of interaction.  
Also, we obviously did not conduct a systematic 
quantitative study, and the respondents’ statements should be 
considered as anecdotal. Still in many settings one cannot 
conduct systematic surveys, because there are simply too few 
people who fulfill specific roles in the organization. Hence 
research will necessarily be more qualitative in nature, similar 
to the study we present here. Still, the study does serve as a 
proof-of-concept and a systematic demonstration of the 
evaluation of causal responsibility in human-automation 
interactions. 
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